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Improving the Quality of Analysis in Fusion Centers:  Making the 
Most of the Nation’s Investment 
Katherine Hibbs Pherson and Roy A. Sullivan, Jr. 
 
Introduction 
Fusion center intelligence analysis has come under the gun for not living up to expectations 
envisioned by the guidelines and funding allocated during the post-9/11 frenzy to create 
structures that would “connect the dots” of terrorist attacks. It is generally criticized for lacking 
analytic quality, rigor, and impact, but little systematic assessment of the products and services 
provided by the now seventy-eight centers across the nation has been undertaken.  No two fusion 
centers may be alike, but general principles for building and sustaining multi-disciplinary 
analytic units can be implemented with more consistency and continuity. This paper explores 
challenges and opportunities for fusion centers, drawing conclusions about how they can 
improve their analytic products and what we as IAFIE educators and trainers should be doing to 
help.  
 
What Is Different about Fusion Center Analysis? 
Intersection of Intelligence and Law Enforcement 
Analytic tradecraft for homeland security is at the intersection of concepts and practices relating 
to intelligence, law enforcement, and first responders, but for the most part it has been built on 
the foundation of existing state and local mechanisms for maintaining public safety and order. 
Homeland security analytic production is still new and evolving as the nation learns to combine 
disciplines, data, policies, priorities, and jurisdictions in ways now needed to protect our citizens 
and infrastructure.  
 
Not surprisingly, analytic efforts lean toward the tactical, reactive techniques of law enforcement 
and emergency response rather than strategic, anticipatory intelligence methods. As a result, 
fusion centers largely focus on: 
 
• Data rather than implications. 
• Cases rather than forecasts. 
• Operations rather than warning. 
 
The Analytic Spectrum (see Figure 1) helps raise awareness of the range of activities that can be 
undertaken in a full-service analytic organization.1 The preponderance of current production is 
descriptive; it selects, characterizes, and manipulates data to aid in response. Explanatory 
                                                             
1
 Pherson, Katherine Hibbs and Randolph H. Pherson, Critical Thinking for Strategic Intelligence (Washington, 
D.C.: CQ Press/Sage Publications, 2013); The Analytic Spectrum categorization of analytic arguments is based on a 
wide range of academic and career experience, but is specifically informed by Aristotle’s Rhetoric; contributions of 
Sherman Kent as cited in Rob Johnston, “Foundations for Meta-Analysis: Developing a Taxonomy of Intelligence 
Analysis Variables,” Studies in Intelligence 47:3 (2003); Russell Ackoff as cited in Bellenger, et al., “Data, 
Information, Knowledge, Wisdom,” (2004), available at: http://www.systems-thinking.org/dikw/dikw.htm; David 
Moore, “Species of Competencies for Intelligence Analysis” (Washington, DC: Advanced Analysis Lab, National 
Security Agency, 2003). 
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what has been established. Estimative analyse
relatively uncommon in the fusion center environment
 
Figure 1: The Analytic Spectrum
 
High Expectations for Fusion Center
In this post-9/11 world, the nation looks to analysts to make sense of incomplete and ambiguous 
information. Many fusion center customer
analysts to find the critical information in avalanches of data, develop 
expertise on complicated topics, and generate with little guidance products that will head off 
catastrophic mistakes and prevent surprise. Much like the Sidney Harris c
difficult part of a mathematical proof is accounted for by the words “and then a miracle occurs,” 
analysts become the critical node in which the human brain is expected to take advantage of the 
systems that have been built, the processe
has been shared. They work under the job title “analyst,” 
experience as students, targeters, or clerks.
and knowledge to meet these expectations as well 
performance standards.  
 
The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security have 
and maintaining fusion center capabilities
Competencies or skills, abilities, behaviors, and other characteristics that homeland security 
                                                             
2
 Guidelines include the following: Global Justice Information 
Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era: Guidelines for Establishing and Operating 
Fusion Centers at the Local, State, and Federal Levels
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers: A Supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines, 
September 2008; Department of Homeland Security, 
Critical Operational Capabilities Gap Mitigation Strategy
http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1296491960442.shtm
 Evaluative analyses examine the s
s that explore what might happen next are 
.  
. 
 
 Analysts  
s view them as magical black boxes, expecting 
in a few short weeks 
artoon in which the 
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 They have not developed the critical thinking skills 
as the training programs to satisfy established 
published guidelines for establishing 
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2
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intelligence professionals need to meet the challenges in their work.
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) working group in 2010, 
analytic competencies from existing training and tradecraft documents to satisfy the need for a 
nationally recognized set of skill
which intelligence and law enforcement overlap.
Intelligence Community Directive 610, Annex G, which defines Core Competencies for 
Intelligence Community Analysis and Production (see Figure 2)
Intelligence Training Standards.4
 
Figure 2: Mapping State and Local Common Competencies to ODNI Core Analytic 
Competencies. 
The Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative
Competencies, specified they should
 
• Incorporated into analyst training course objectives, particularly for those courses 
intended to enhance and update capabilities.
• Used by managers and training partners
determine which programs analysts should attend.
 
Efforts to establish evaluation criteria and methodology
nor implemented. Taking the competencies into consideration in designing and implementing 
learning activities highlights intelligence analysis best practices and provide
foundation to which fusion center analysts can tether their professional development effo
 
Easy Targets in the Political Crossfire
                                                             
3
 Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 
2010. 
4
 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
21, 2007; Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, 
Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies in the United States
5
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Post-disaster commissions and policymakers often seek to “fix” the inevitable gaps and 
miscommunications they identify with the benefit of hindsight by proposing the creation of an 
overarching organization to “ensure” disparate knowledge is brought together. Examples include 
the formation in 1947 of the Central Intelligence Agency after Pearl Harbor, the establishment in 
the 1980s of Director of Central Intelligence “centers” such as the Counterterrorism Center (after 
the increase in international terrorist attacks, including the against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut) 
and the Center for Security Evaluation (after the penetration of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and 
the Beirut embassy bombing), and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002.  
 
Addressing new and evolving problems with consolidated resources appears over time to pay off, 
but success depends on authorities, leadership, partnerships, and showing quick value that earns 
the continued support and respect of reviewers, partners, and potential critics. The scope of the 
creation of homeland security entities is unsurpassed in its ambitious goals to bridge the gap 
between national and domestic security, between law enforcement and intelligence, and between 
federal and state, local, and tribal. Creating umbrella organizations and plans is not easy, but 
even more difficult is getting them implemented with elegance and efficiency when they by 
definition are forcing change to established ways of doing business. 
 
Fusion centers are a good idea: they provide a transitional buffer that allows each state or urban 
area to translate its unique way of organizing public order and public safety to tie into national 
systems and capabilities. At their best, they should connect, reinforce, and stiffen the beams of 
our nation’s complex infrastructure to ensure that federal, state, and local resources are 
communicating effectively, sharing information and analytic context. We identify them as a 
fundamental part of the solution; we need to give even more attention to the challenges and 
problems they face in building the analytic capabilities that will fulfill the expectations.  
 
These seventy-eight centers are among the most obvious targets for criticism from all the 
elements they are charged to bring together. Some are not convinced of the imperative for 
change, others do not have the resources or knowledge to bring about the change, and still others 
are content to deflect attention from themselves. Reports such as the investigation by the US 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations last October found that Department of 
Homeland Security efforts to engage fusion centers has not “yielded significant useful 
information to support federal counterterrorism intelligence efforts.”6 The conclusion is that 
fusion centers are not meeting expectations for collection or analysis.  
 
What Are the Challenges in Improving Fusion Center Analytic Capabilities?  
Focus and Scope  
One of the first challenges that fusion centers faced in the post 9/11 environment was that 
terrorism activities at state levels were not numerous enough to justify units focused only on 
terrorism and not crime or other local disasters. Most fusion centers quickly resolved this 
problem by expanding to an “all crime” and then an “all crimes, all hazards” model. This placed 
fusion centers uniquely at the intelligence/law enforcement nexus, but also made it easier to 
                                                             
6
 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United 
States Senate, “Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers,” October 3, 2012. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss5/31
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.3S.29
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implement law enforcement case-based approaches rather than strategic intelligence analytic 
techniques. 
 
Constrained Resources 
No single challenge is as disruptive to fusion center development as resource restraints and the 
complex mechanisms they endure to receive funding. Fusion centers have been largely 
dependent on federal funds to get off the ground, but they lack the size and resiliency of federal 
organizations. Federal budget cuts have been devastating to some operations.  
 
As post-9/11 federal dollars dwindle, fusion centers are struggling to maintain their funding; 
some centers have been eviscerated by cuts resulting from changes in risk-based methodologies 
for allocating federal dollars. Belt tightening at the state and local levels since the downturn in 
the economy has added to this strain. Limited resources impact fusion centers at every level from 
employee retention to travel and training to production. 
 
Management Challenges 
Fusion centers face both systemic and personnel management challenges. Their rapid creation 
and the limited oversight given to their implementation have led to dramatic variations in 
organization, size, and capability. Equipping states with basic guidelines gave them the recipe 
and the ingredients, but not the institutional knowledge and experience to build effective centers 
from scratch that could quickly produce quality analysis. Fusion centers lacked the extensive 
governing guidelines and policies that federal agencies developed over more than half a century.  
 
Most fusion centers are managed by state law enforcement organizations. Many of the well-
meaning center administrators have limited understanding of the analytic process or experience 
involved in managing analysts and analytic production. Fusion center analysts become frustrated 
that their managers do not know what they do—a sure sign is when the manager tells them to “go 
analyze something”—or the myriad ways they can contribute to the mission. Law enforcement 
hierarchies tend to tend to pigeonhole analysts, even those with advanced degrees or years of 
experience, as subordinate rather than equal to sworn officers. This discourages many analysts 
from being as productive as they might and lowers their morale. 
 
Analyst Turnover 
Most fusion centers struggle to retain talented analysts. Those who are sworn officers often 
rotate out of the fusion center after a few years; their career ladders likely will not bring them 
back into intelligence or analytic assignments. Fusion center analysts are almost universally paid 
less than their federal counterparts, sometimes significantly so, and they can make even more in 
private sector jobs. Advancement opportunities are nearly nonexistent because many, if not most, 
supervisory roles are held by sworn officers. An analyst at a fusion center can expect to remain 
in the same position and at the same pay for the entirety of his or her career.  
 
After gaining invaluable experience, many move on to federal or commercial jobs. One of the 
authors worked in a fusion center with a total of six civilian analysts, four of whom gave their 
resignation notices in four months. When analysts depart, their skills and knowledge are usually 
lost because the centers do not have a deep bench of similarly skilled and knowledgeable 
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analysts to fall back on, and they lack effective means of capturing knowledge for recall. Most 
centers can only afford to have one analyst focus on a given topic. 
 
Operational Response 
Fusion centers must provide near instant, reactive responses to their customers; these take 
precedence over strategic warnings and extended timeframes. The centers constantly need to 
prove their value and generate buy-in from law enforcement organizations and public and private 
sector partners. Many of the principal consumers of fusion center products—from police chiefs 
to the governors—do not know what they can task fusion centers to analyze or even how to task 
them.  
 
Law enforcement organizations rely on quantitative rather than qualitative metrics when 
evaluating effectiveness—numbers of convictions, citations, or traffic fatalities—and apply 
similar evaluation criteria to fusion centers. These drivers push fusion centers to focus their time 
on information requests, background checks, recurring bulletins, and other case support type 
production. These products have obvious value but complicate the allocation of time for 
explanatory, evaluative, and estimative analysis. 
 
How Can Fusion Centers Better Develop Their Analytic Capabilities? 
Our review of publications, course evaluations, curricula, and comments from fusion center 
students is by no means exhaustive, but that foundation--combined with our firsthand experience 
and interactions with fusion center managers, analysts, and customers—reinforces several best 
practices for building analytic organizations.7 
 
1. Skills, skills, and more skills. The Common Competencies clearly identify critical 
thinking, analytic tools and techniques, and communications and writing skills that 
characterize mature, fully functional state and local analytic efforts. These are 
challenging to teach and develop, which is why so many echo the bumper sticker: 
“Critical Thinking: The Next National Deficit.” Production checklists, process maps, and 
other visual reminders help make the practice of solid thinking skills more concrete and 
less ethereal. One example that has worked well with homeland security analysts is our 
Analyst’s Roadmap (see Figure 3). It has been adjusted for other analytic units and 
purposes.8 
 
Figure 1: The Analyst's Roadmap. 
                                                             
7 Specific fusion center interactions over the past five years in which the authors have been personally engaged 
include: Supporting since 2004 a variety of DHS components in their outreach, training, and mentoring for fusion 
center analysts. This includes supporting strategic analytic, training, and tradecraft components in their interactions 
with fusion centers; Consulting with and training five fusion centers in 2012-2013 either directly or as part of a 
Department of Justice grant to facilitate the use of indicators as a mechanism for collaboration between fusion 
centers and first responders; Designing and teaching the Analytic and Critical Thinking Skills (ACTS) Workshop on 
behalf of the DHS State and Local Program Office (SLPO) to 319 analysts in 13 locations between 2008 and 2010. 
Designing and reviewing three pilot fusion centers through the Analytic Skills and Knowledge Review (ASKR), a 
joint project of FEMA and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis in 2010 to assess analysis, product planning, 
technology, and training; Serving as an analyst in the Delaware Information and Analysis Center and as a fusion 
center analyst teaching the Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training (FIAT).  
8 Pherson and Pherson, Critical Thinking for Strategic Intelligence, Inside Back Cover. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss5/31
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.3S.29
 2. Consistency in terminology and techniques
differences in terminology, thinking styles, and techniques can help 
fusion center analytic efforts to 
Intelligence, for instance, 
in intelligence and law enforcement analytic efforts, inco
practices from other nations.
who believe that they do not need to learn “strategic” techniques because they work on 
cases. We must balance teaching them what they want to kno
know to improve the quality of their work.
  
3. Analytic standards to guide analysts and managers through the analysis, production, and 
evaluation processes.  The standards the ODNI has promulgated in Intelligence 
Community Directive 203 and against which it evaluates Intelligence Community 
products should form the basis of our training and educational efforts to help analysts 
develop the skills outlined in the Common Competencies.
process of being updated; we 
utility to state and local intelligence analysis.
 
4. Collaborative work on hard issues and products.
world, expertise is increasingly distributed as the boundaries blu
operator, and decision maker.
organization or specialty for information, insight, and assistance.
. Focusing on the commonalities and not the 
unite and allow 
move forward. In writing Critical Thinking for Strategic 
the authors tried to bring together and build on the good work 
rporating complementary 
 This helps break down the mental stovepipes for analysts 
w and what they need to 
 
 The standards are in the 
should be alert to adjustments that would increase their 
 
 In our complex and interconnected 
r between analyst, 
 Analysts need to reach out to those outside their immediate 
 Collaboration has 
315 
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become a buzzword that is difficult to make work in practice; one interagency study 
concluded that it works most effectively when six imperatives (see Figure 4) are met.9 
The biggest incentives to collaborate are that the analyst will save work over the long run 
and the analysis will be more compelling because it will answer the needs of a broader 
audience. 
 
Figure 2: Achieving a Robust Collaborative Environment. 
 
         
5. Continued growth and practice. Analysis is no different than music, sports, or any other 
skills-related endeavor; expertise is built over time and not over night. It requires 
practice, reflection, challenge, and working with those who have more experience or 
knowledge than yourself. Rob Johnston pointed out that it may take ten years for an 
analyst to become truly experienced; fusion center analysts need to build expertise much 
more quickly than that.10 
 
A myriad of opportunities have been presented for fusion center analysts to learn together, but 
they are not coordinated and sometimes conflict. The analysts themselves have responded by 
forming their own trusted subgroups, but even those are sometimes hampered in writing 
collaborative products by organizational and oversight restrictions. Initiatives such as the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Field Activities Support Taskforce (FAST) and the National 
                                                             
9 Pherson and Pherson, Critical Thinking for Strategic Intelligence, 59-69; See also Randolph H. Pherson and Joan 
McIntyre, “The Essence of Collaboration: The IC Experience,” Collaboration in the National Security Arena: Myths 
and Reality—What Science and Experience can Contribute to Its Success, June 2009; The article is part of a 
collection published by the Topical Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA), Multi-Agency/Multi-Disciplinary 
White Papers in Support of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-WMD in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense/DDR&E/RTTO. 
10 Rob Johnston, Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, CIA), 2005. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5
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Counterterrorism Center’s outreach efforts are commendable; their success will depend on how 
well they build on one another’s efforts to mentor and assist fusion center analysis and 
incorporate their challenges into the larger homeland security system.  
 
What Can IAFIE Educators and Trainers Who Work with Fusion Center 
Analysts Do to Help? 
• Expose your students to topics of direct concern to fusion centers. This means focusing as 
much or more on domestic threat actors versus international actors. One fusion center 
director told us that he was surprised when one of his analysts returned from a class 
saying that it was not useful to her because it was “all about terrorism.” Most analysts are 
involved in crime analysis and increasingly in infrastructure protection. Use a mixture of 
cases and issues to get them used to the fact that all of these specialties are critical to 
fusion center analytic success.   
 
• Focus on the application of critical thinking skills to homeland security issues and the 
production of actionable products. The analysts we teach and mentor across the 
intelligence, homeland security, law enforcement, and defense communities appreciate 
the training they get, but characterize much of the coursework as descriptive or too 
theoretical. They learn some “interesting stuff” but are not coached in how actually to do 
analysis or how to know when they are doing it well. As one student wrote in an 
evaluation form, “I don’t just need to know that the “So What?” is critical, I need to be 
told how to find it and to recognize it when I have found it.” In short, they are asking to 
be taught the “how” of intelligence analysis and not just the “what.” They know they are 
at risk, and they do not want to be wrong. 
 
The core thinking habits we call the “Five Habits of the Master Thinker” and their accompanying 
Structured Analytic Techniques (SATs) provide a manageable framework for analysts to get a 
handle on the skills that will make a difference in their analytic capabilities.  
 
• Know when to challenge your key assumptions—usually far more often than you think! 
 
• Consider alternative explanations or hypotheses for all events—including the null 
hypothesis and the deception hypothesis when applicable.  
 
• Look for inconsistent data that provides sufficient justification to quickly discard a 
candidate hypothesis. 
 
• Focus on the key drivers that best explain what has occurred or what is about to happen. 
 
• Understand your customers’ needs and the overarching context within which you are 
working.  
 
Educators and trainers can help make the Common Competencies, Analytic Standards, and 
Fusion Center Guidelines come to life for the analysts. They are the foundations of the common 
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understanding that will link analytic units to mutually reinforcing goals and collaborative 
projects. 
 
• Reinforce best practices in collaboration. As trainers and educators, we can establish 
good practices through the small group and team exercises in our courses. We should 
encourage working in cross-organizational and cross-disciplinary teams. By having 
students work on cases and examples that are outside their areas of expertise, we can 
underscore that working alone or not reaching beyond our work group or comfort zone 
increases the risk that we will be wrong in our analysis or that our audience will be 
unimpressed with its limited scope.  
 
This helps fusion center analytic development in several critical ways: 
 
• Fusion centers struggle to develop subject matter experts, but analysts can take the 
initiative to leverage contacts at other centers to expand their knowledge base. We 
recently worked with analysts at one fusion center on a topic that is a concern to only a 
small number of states. As we facilitated their analytic process, the participants quickly 
realized that they could produce a better product by reaching out and engaging the centers 
in neighboring states rather than tackling the problem alone. Similarly, centers that 
normally do not deal with the topic would have a reach back capability within the fusion 
center network to analysts within this small, self-formed “working group” should the 
issue suddenly become a problem in their areas of responsibilities. 
 
• Turnover and inexperience leads analysts to “reinvent the wheel” for problems that other 
centers or analytic organizations have already addressed. Analysts can expose one 
another to methods, including Structured Analytic Techniques that have helped them 
work through both threat and administrative issues, serving as in-network mentors to one 
another. 
 
• Fusion center analysts have much they can learn from one another; we find many who are 
surprised that “not only my center has this problem.” Collaboration and leadership skills 
help fusion centers analysts work together to tackle shared struggles and challenges. 
“Training events” and conferences tend to focus on sharing information about threats and 
vulnerabilities rather than working together on hard problems. Enabling and empowering 
analysts to develop organic solutions to their challenges will encourage improved 
analysis.  
 
• Be innovative in using technology for continuous distance learning and collaboration. 
Fusion centers and the law enforcement organizations they work with are besieged by 
equipment and technology vendors, but the solutions tend to be vendor-specific and few 
demonstrate new or cost effective technologies for collaboration or analysis. Educators 
and trainers have the opportunity to expose analysts to cutting edge technologies, 
particularly free or inexpensive options that would directly benefit analytic production 
without a negative impact on operational tempo. We can demonstrate to them in training 
environments some of the ways they might work collaboratively back in their work 
environments. 
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Both synchronous and asynchronous systems are useful to fusion centers. Synchronous three-
dimensional virtual worlds with students and instructors interacting as avatars are particularly 
potent for distance learning and collaboration; they reproduce real world interaction using the 
latest in gaming technology and eliminate obstacles of geographic distance. Asynchronous 
solutions are more effective for analytic tools because they enable use by participants on 
different schedules, time zones, or office buildings without leaving their work environments.  
 
• Do not forget that managers of analysis need education and training as well. Many 
fusion centers do not have the luxury of having analysts manage their analytic units. This 
can be an effective way to ensure that analytic insights directly support operations or it 
can lead to the dilution of analysis into an amalgamation of facts, data, and straight-line 
trends that do not help customers anticipate future challenges. Managers can best 
communicate with their analysts if they focus on preparing and supporting analysts 
through the conceptualization and production processes, guiding and evaluating their 
work through the use of standards, and providing them consistent mentoring and 
feedback.  
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